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Abstract
Background: More than a year after an influenza pandemic was declared in June 2009, the World Health
Organization declared the pandemic to be over. Evaluations of the pandemic response are beginning to appear in
the public domain.
Discussion: We argue that, despite the enormous effort made to control the pandemic, it is now time to
acknowledge that many of the population-based public health interventions may not have been well considered.
Prior to the pandemic, there was limited scientific evidence to support border control measures. In particular no
border screening measures would have detected prodromal or asymptomatic infections, and asymptomatic
infections with pandemic influenza were common. School closures, when they were partial or of short duration,
would not have interrupted spread of the virus in school-aged children, the group with the highest rate of
infection worldwide. In most countries where they were available, neuraminidase inhibitors were not distributed
quickly enough to have had an effect at the population level, although they will have benefited individuals, and
prophylaxis within closed communities will have been effective. A pandemic specific vaccine will have protected
the people who received it, although in most countries only a small minority was vaccinated, and often a small
minority of those most at risk. The pandemic vaccine was generally not available early enough to have influenced
the shape of the first pandemic wave and it is likely that any future pandemic vaccine manufactured using current
technology will also be available too late, at least in one hemisphere.
Summary: Border screening, school closure, widespread anti-viral prophylaxis and a pandemic-specific vaccine
were unlikely to have been effective during a pandemic which was less severe than anticipated in the pandemic
plans of many countries. These were cornerstones of the population-based public health response. Similar
responses would be even less likely to be effective in a more severe pandemic. We agree with the
recommendation from the World Health Organisation that pandemic preparedness plans need review.
Background and Discussion
The World Health Organization (WHO) declared that
spread of the newly recognised quadruple reassortant
i n f l u e n z aAH 1 N 1v i r u ss a t i s f i e dt h ec r i t e r i af o rap a n -
demic on June 11, 2009, [1] although technically condi-
tions for declaring a pandemic had been met some
weeks earlier. The virus, generally referred to as pan-
demic influenza H1N1 2009 (pH1N1), had first been
recognised in Mexico and the United States in late April
2009. More than a year later, WHO has declared the
pandemic to be over and early assessments of the global
response have commenced [2].
When the pandemic was declared, Dr Margaret Chan,
the Director of WHO, advised member states to imple-
ment their pandemic plans [1] and health agencies,
other government agencies and businesses worked hard
to do this. In most countries it may be correct to con-
clude, as did an evaluation of the UK response, that the
“pandemic and the response it generated have provided
confirmation of the value of planning and preparedness”
[3]. It is also true that the apparent success of the
response in 2009 must not lead to complacency. We
n o wk n o wt h a tt h er e l a t i v e l yl o wv i r u l e n c eo fp H 1 N 1
* Correspondence: heath.kelly@mh.org.au
1Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory, Melbourne, Australia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Kelly et al. BMC Public Health 2011, 11:78
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/11/78
© 2011 Kelly et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.meant we did not need to have implemented effective
responses to get a good outcome.
The response to the pandemic included clinical and
public health measures. In developed countries, such as
Australia, the clinical response was effective for those
whose illnesses were serious [4]. Clinical care will very
likely have reduced the number of deaths due to pan-
demic influenza [5], although the use of extra-corporeal
membrane oxygenation was seen as a last resort and was
not supported by the conclusions of a systematic review
[6]. In developed and developing countries, the public
health response focused on both the individual and the
population. Individual responses promoted attention to
personal hygiene, with an emphasis on cough hygiene
and hand washing, which may not have been optimal [7],
and the use of personal protective equipment for those
considered to be at increased risk of infection [8]. Popu-
lation-based public health responses to the pandemic
focused on two major elements: non-pharmaceutical and
pharmaceutical interventions. The former comprised
border control and various elements of social distancing,
while the latter focussed on anti-viral medication for
treatment and/or prophylaxis, and the development of a
strain-specific vaccine.
Australia used the pharmaceutical and non-pharma-
ceutical interventions detailed in its pandemic plan [9]
in an effort to delay entry of the virus into the country,
contain the virus to limited areas once it had entered
the country, sustain a response when widespread com-
munity transmission had been established and to protect
the vulnerable [10] - the latter being a new response
phase formulated once it was realised that the pandemic
was not associated with the high case fatality ratios that
had been anticipated [11]. We use Australia’s experience
to draw attention to issues related to the public health
population-based pandemic response. The scope of this
perspective does not allow us to consider other cate-
gories of response.
Now is the time to acknowledge that a number of the
strategies used in response to the 2009 pandemic could
not control the spread of a novel influenza virus and
their place in future pandemic response plans needs to
be reconsidered in light of emerging new evidence. We
examine four critical cornerstones of Australia’sp u b l i c
health population-based response, namely border con-
trol, school closure (as an example of social distancing),
the use of anti-viral medication and the development
and use of a pandemic vaccine. We provide evidence
from the pandemic experience in other countries to
support our arguments.
Border control
In a very different world, Australia successfully applied
maritime quarantine to delay the entry of a pandemic
H1N1 virus into the country in 1918 and 1919. This was
in contrast to many of Australia’s Pacific neighbours. For
instance, the virus reached New Zealand in October 1918
but did not enter Australia until January of the following
year. Estimated death rates in countries where the entry
of the virus had been delayed were lower than rates
where earlier entry was documented [12].
Prior to the 2009 pandemic, modelling studies had
suggested a very limited role for border screening,
providing an estimated delay of only 1-2 weeks without
draconian measures that would be economically unac-
ceptable in most countries [13]. A review of border con-
trol in Australia following the SARS epidemic pointed
out the opportunity cost of screening. No case was iden-
tified despite 1.8 million passengers being screened, 794
referred for further evaluation and four identified as
possible cases [14]. A similar lack of success was sug-
gested in a review of the likely success of border control
for influenza in other countries [15]. Indeed, it can be
argued that prior to the pandemic there was only very
limited scientific evidence for border control as an effec-
tive intervention. Despite this in 2009, as an island
nation with history on its side, Australia, like many
other (non-island) countries, embraced the concept.
Australia implemented a combination of approaches
in an attempt to detect infected arriving passengers at
international airports. These comprised notification of
health status of passengers by airline staff (the pilot or
crew identified passengers with respiratory symptoms),
thermal scanning (infra-red cameras were installed in
airport terminals), health declaration cards (the passen-
ger reported current symptoms) and nurses at border
entry points reviewed and tested passengers detected
by one of these screening tools. In the Australian state
of Queensland, although the number of passengers
screened was not reported, and was likely to have been
many tens of thousands, only four cases of confirmed
pandemic influenza were found from 780 passengers
identified by one or more of these border screening
measures [16]. No cases were detected by similar
screening at the busy international airport in Perth,
Western Australia (unpublished data).
It has been suggested that Australia did well in its
response to managing the pandemic, specifically in
delaying establishment of community transmission [17].
During this time preparations were made to respond to
ap a n d e m i ct h a tw a sa n t i c i pated to result in many
deaths. However, based on epidemiological and model-
ling evidence, we have demonstrated that community
transmission was almost certainly established in the
state of Victoria around the time the virus was first
recognised in North and Central America in late April
2009 [18]. This followed one or more unrecognised
silent importations, and spread of the virus in Australia
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from overseas. We now know that this is an entirely
plausible scenario, given that a significant proportion of
pH1N1 infections were afebrile [19] or entirely asympto-
matic [20] and therefore impossible to detect at the bor-
der - or anywhere else.
This should not be surprising, as the finding that a
high proportion of influenza infections are asympto-
matic or afebrile was not new. Published experimental
data from volunteer studies had previously shown that
33% of proven seasonal influenza infections were asymp-
tomatic, but this varied by influenza type and subtype
[21]. In particular, as few as 37% of experimental infec-
tions with influenza A(H1N1) were associated with fever
recorded as >37.8°C, while 30% were completely asymp-
tomatic [21]. Moreover, viral shedding in the pre-
symptomatic phase of influenza infection has recently
been confirmed to occur in approximately 1-8% of natu-
rally acquired infections, in a study in which 14% of all
influenza infections were asymptomatic and 31% of
infections with influenza A (H1N1 or H3N2) did not
have fever at the onset of other symptoms [22].
Prodromal, asymptomatic and afebrile infections can-
not be detected by temperature measurement, one of
the main components of border control, whether by
thermal scanning or by core temperature measurement
of symptomatic travellers [23]. Moreover, the propor-
tion of afebrile or asymptomatic people is likely to be
higher in infected travellers, as more severely unwell
people will be less likely to travel. Thermal imaging is
therefore even less likely to have been effective at the
borders than in other places where more severely ill
patients are seen [24]. Indeed, China used intensive
thermal screening for pH1N1 at airports and had a
positive detection rate of only 14 cases per million pas-
sengers screened [25].
The use of border control was evidently not based on a
current understanding of influenza epidemiology and was
not supported by modelling studies. In particular one
modelling study, published two years before the identifi-
cation of the current pandemic virus, showed that past
pandemic patterns could not be adequately modelled
without inclusion of asymptomatic infection (as well as
varying degrees of pre-existing immunity) [26].
Nonetheless, an early evaluation of the 2009 pan-
demic, with limitations acknowledged by its authors,
suggested that border screening may have led to delays
of 7 to 12 days in the establishment of local transmis-
sion [27]. We accept that border screening will have
detected a limited number of influenza cases, but sug-
gest that many more cases will have been missed than
were detected. In Australia, at least, it is likely that bor-
der screening was implemented after the virus had
entered the country [18]. On balance, we conclude that
border screening was as ineffective as it should have
been expected to be.
School closure
It is generally accepted that children, especially children
of school age, are responsible for amplification of influ-
enza epidemics [28]. An intervention targeting schools
could therefore theoretically be effective in interrupting
an epidemic. This assumption is supported by modelling
studies, but only when all schools are closed early and
remain closed for an unrealistically long period, up to
the duration of the pandemic [29]. Modelling also
shows that delay in closing schools, or partial closure of
schools, are less effective interventions, [29] although, if
school closures are timely, they may delay the peak and
decrease the peak incidence of the epidemic [30].
As expected, the pH1N1 infection rate was high
among school aged children [20,31]. Of the first 997
cases of confirmed pH1N1 infection in the state of Vic-
toria in Australia, 67% were aged 5-17 years [32]. In
Australia, school closure was intended to be associated
w i t hv o l u n t a r yh o m eq u a r a n t i n e .W h e nas c h o o l-o r
class within a school - was closed, members of the class
were asked to voluntarily quarantine themselves at
home. This meant that parents of young children were
frequently required to take time off work to care for
children who would otherwise have been at school.
Home quarantine has its own risks. We have recently
shown that when an entire family was quarantined, the
risk of secondary spread within households was
increased by approximately 2.5-fold [33].
Moreover, compliance with other social distancing
measures needed to have been effective for school clo-
sures themselves to have been effective. A survey in
Western Australia of parents of school children whose
schools were closed at some stage during the pandemic
indicated that 74% of home-quarantined children parti-
cipated in outside activities at least once during the
nominal quarantine period, recording an average of 3.7
activities per child. Most commonly reported were
attendances at sporting events, parks, beaches and
stores, places where it is likely other children would be
exposed [34]. Public documentation of school closure
during the pH1N1 epidemic in Australia is minimal, but
the policy in the early phase of the pH1N1 response was
to close only those classes with confirmed cases, escalat-
ing to whole schools where multiple classes across dif-
ferent age groups were affected. In the state of
Queensland only 2.8% of all schools were closed for
short periods [16]. In Western Australia school closures
were only for one week and sometimes involved only
closure of specific classes [34]. Too limited in scope and
time, these strategies could not have been effective in
interrupting the spread of the pandemic.
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conclusions from modelling [30]. Early widespread school
closures in a defined area were successful in delaying
pandemic spread in that area, but when the schools were
re-opened, pandemic spread resumed [35]. In Hong
Kong closure of kindergartens, pre-schools and primary
schools appeared to decrease the attack rate in children
aged less than 12 years for the weeks of closure [36] but
the effect on the final attack rate in school children is yet
to be evaluated. Indeed, it has been argued that the
potential benefit of closing schools during a pandemic
must be balanced against the enormous social disruption
that ensues [37]. Only where schools were closed early
and remained closed would there have been any signifi-
cant interruption of the spread of the pandemic.
Neuraminidase inhibitors for treatment and prophylaxis
Countries around the world adopted different
approaches to the use of neuraminidase inhibitors
(NAIs) in their pandemic plans. In addition to treatment
provisions, Australia opted for a stockpile of approxi-
mately 10 million courses of NAIs with the intention of
implementing widespread prophylaxis, which has been
s h o w ni nt r i a l st ob e5 8 - 8 4 %e f f e c t i v ei np r e v e n t i n g
laboratory proven influenza infection if given early fol-
lowing exposure [38]. However, even in the early phases
of the response, when numbers of suspected and con-
firmed pH1N1 cases were low, those with responsibility
for contact tracing were rapidly overwhelmed. The logis-
tical difficulties of timely delivery of NAIs to those eligi-
ble for treatment or prophylaxis were such that it was
likely only a minority received their medication in time
for it to be effective. Lateness of NAI availability has
been confirmed in a Victorian study of treatment doses.
Oseltamivir was prescribed for only 207 (21%) of the
first 1,000 confirmed cases. Of 690 cases confirmed not
to have received oselatamivir, 670 were not eligible
because more than 48 hours had elapsed since symptom
onset (Unpublished data, James Fielding, epidemiologist,
Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory).
Other approaches to NAI distribution were used around
the world, with varying effectiveness. For example, the UK
National Health Service implemented an electronic check-
list to allow patients rapid access to NAIs. Bypassing doc-
tors and laboratory testing, this system aimed to speed up
NAI availability. However, only 1932/16,560 (17%) of peo-
ple who received NAIs using the electronic checklist sub-
sequently tested positive for pH1N1 [39].
On the other hand, in four outbreaks in Singapore mili-
tary camps, when NAIs were able to be delivered effec-
tively in conjunction with isolation of confirmed cases and
quarantine of contacts, a beneficial effect could be demon-
strated. These measures, which included ring prophylaxis
with oseltamivir, resulted in a reduction of the infection
rate in the outbreaks from 6.4% to 0.6% [40]. This study
demonstrates the potential benefit of NAIs if available
early in outbreaks, and when combined with social distan-
cing. However extension of this strategy to large heteroge-
neous populations remains unproven and it may be
feasible only in closed communities, such as boarding
schools, military barracks and residential care facilities.
Another important consideration in setting out to pro-
vide mass treatment and prophylaxis with NAIs is the pos-
sibility of development of resistant strains. Surveillance
studies during the first wave of the pandemic demon-
strated a low frequency of resistance to oseltamivir and
no reported resistance to zanamivir. Prior to 2007, it was
rare to detect oseltamivir-resistant influenza strains in
untreated patients, due to the compromised infectivity and
transmissibility of many of the resistant mutants in the
absence of drug pressure. But in 2007/2008 an oseltami-
vir-resistant seasonal A(H1N1) variant emerged that
demonstrated viral fitness at least equivalent to the oselta-
mivir-susceptible strain. The resistant strain spread rapidly
around the world and by 2009 had completely replaced
the susceptible strain [41]. An oseltamivir-resistant
pH1N1 virus might also retain viral fitness and sub-
sequently spread throughout the community. Fortunately,
to date, only a low frequency of oseltamivir-resistant
pH1N1 strains have been identified [42].
An anti-viral stockpile without a well-developed logis-
tic strategy and resourcing for effective early delivery for
treatment of cases and prophylaxis of contacts is not an
adequate plan for successful limitation of viral spread in
a population, especially considering that the high pro-
portion of cases with asymptomatic and mild infections
will not be identified. Moreover, as we have seen with
seasonal H1N1 viruses, resistance may develop to NAIs
and a resistant virus may retain viral fitness allowing it
to become widespread. This would render stockpiles
useless. Revised pandemic plans should therefore con-
sider limiting the use of NAIs to treatment of those
with more severe influenza infection or medical condi-
tions that make them more vulnerable to complications.
Dependent on the availability of NAIs and access to
appropriate medical care, treatment should be com-
menced early in the course of the illness. In Germany
the median delay between symptom onset and antiviral
treatment was significantly longer in fatal cases than
non-fatal cases [43]. Prophylaxis should probably be
reserved for closed communities, with any plan for
wide-scale use of prophylactic NAIs dependent on a
large workforce able to perform contact tracing and a
detailed logistics plan for early delivery.
A pandemic strain specific influenza vaccine
After China, Australia was the second country in the
world to roll out a population-based pandemic vaccine
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by 30 September 2009 [44]. The first wave of the pan-
demic in Australia had ended by this date. It was not
expected that the vaccine would have been available in
time to modify the first pandemic wave anywhere in the
world. However, even in Australia, it was a case of ‘too
much too late’. An early estimate of 18% was made for
population wide coverage for the vaccine [45].
Most pandemic vaccines in Australia were formulated as
multi-dose vials. Given recommendations that the vial
contents should be used or discarded within 24 hours of
first use, wastage was expected with this formulation. It
has been estimated that around 40% of pH1N1 vaccine
doses delivered to Australian general practices may have
been wasted [46]. There was also concern among some
immunisation providers, and within the general commu-
nity, that the multi-dose vials contained the preservative
thiomersal, which had been phased out of paediatric vac-
cines, and that use of the vials potentially increased the
risk of contamination, including with blood-borne viruses
[47]. Such concerns, whether ill-founded or not, were
likely to have impacted adversely on vaccine uptake, even
in identified high risk groups [48]. While it may be reason-
able to assume that vaccine uptake would have been
higher if the disease had indeed been more severe, future
pandemic plans need to include greater flexibility in vac-
cine purchasing and contracting arrangements, and refine-
ment of vaccine delivery protocols and public messaging,
in order to minimise wastage and optimise uptake [49].
The 21st century marks the first time pandemic-specific
vaccines have been manufactured on a large scale. A preli-
minary report from Germany using the screening method
estimated pandemic vaccine effectiveness for an adjuvanted
pandemic vaccine of 97% in people aged 14-59 years [50].
A similar high level of protection has been reported for
children in Canada [51], although a more modest effective-
ness of 72% has subsequently been reported from a pooled
case control analysis from a number of European countries
[52]. While vaccines were effective in protecting indivi-
duals, population coverage in Australia and other countries
was unlikely to have been sufficient for the vaccine to have
modulated the spread of the pandemic virus. However
some European countries, such as Germany, experienced a
very modest first pandemic wave [43] and, had they
achieved high coverage with pandemic vaccine, may have
been able to modify pandemic virus transmission in the
n e x ti n f l u e n z as e a s o n .N o n e t h e l e s s ,t h ee x p e r i e n c ew i t h
pH1N1 suggests that a pandemic vaccine will always be
too late, at least for one hemisphere, using current vaccine
manufacturing technology.
Summary
Control of pandemic influenza is a critical issue and one
on which the world has already spent billions of dollars,
both in planning and during the recent response to
pH1N1. There are obvious lessons to be learnt from the
first pandemic of the 21st century, a pandemic which
was much less severe than many plans had anticipated
[53]. If we think our response to this pandemic was ade-
quate, we may be falsely reassured. A more severe pan-
demic may find us wanting. A mild pandemic may find
us over reacting. However, with appropriate collection
and analysis of data it should be possible to identify the
severity of future pandemics early and to make a mea-
sured response [54]. The World Health Organization,
governments and other agencies around the world are
currently involved in reviews of the management of the
pandemic [55]. It is vital that these reviews, while not
diminishing the commitment and hard work of those
who implemented the response plans in 2009, carefully
assess the evidence base for those plans.
In addition, the widespread implications of the
r e s p o n s et ot h ep a n d e m i c-f o rp o l i c ym a k e r s ,h e a l t h
professionals and the public - make it important for
these reviews to be in the public domain. In Australia,
where pandemic reviews are not yet in the public
domain, there were examples where messages appeared
to be mixed, and which confused both the public and
healthcare professionals [56]. Partially closing some
schools for short periods and not implementing other
social distancing measures, such as cancelling public
gatherings, is just one example.
Although we have provided examples from Australia, we
believe our arguments will have relevance for many other
countries. ‘One size fits all’, where authorities have only
one response strategy for viruses with different infection
rates and case fatality ratios, is not an appropriate response
to pandemic preparedness. Revised pandemic plans should
include different responses for different pandemic severi-
ties [57]. All areas of pandemic planning need to be
re-examined, but perhaps by alternative processes to those
that led to current plans. Certainly, new evidence about
the practical difficulties and/or ineffectiveness of control
measures, such as border control and school closures,
needs to be considered seriously. The inadequacy of many
plans has recently been publicly acknowledged by the
head of the WHO’s global influenza programme. Speaking
at a United Kingdom Health Protection Agency confer-
ence on the international response to the H1N1 pandemic,
Dr Sylvie Briand is reported to have said that the contain-
ment strategy during the last pandemic was ‘not feasible’
and that guidelines might have to be overhauled [58]. We
believe this is sound advice.
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